Sensor Intel Series

Enterprises Should Consider Replacing Employees’ Home TP-Link Routers

An examination of CVE trends from February 2025 scanning data.
By Merlyn Albery-Speyer (additional contributions by Malcolm Heath)
March 06, 2025
4 min. read
Previous article in this series

The Sensor Intel Series is created in partnership with Efflux, who maintains a globally distributed network of sensors from which we derive attack telemetry.

Additional insights and contributions provided by the F5 Threat Campaigns team.

Introduction

Welcome to this month's installment of the Sensor Intel Series, our monthly summary of vulnerability intelligence based on distributed passive sensor data, looking at data from February of 2025.

Top 10 Scanned Review

CVE-2017-984: PHPUnit Remote Code Execution

Back in June 2024 we saw huge volumes of scanning for a PHPUnit Remote Code Execution vulnerability, CVE-2017-9841. We see large volumes of scanning again this month in February 2025. Not quite to the same scale, but similarly from many disparate geolocations and from a large number of IP addresses. Surely by now, anyone with such an old PHPUnit bug has been compromised many times over by this point.

If you're using PHP you can run phpunit --version. If it's in the range >=5.0.10, <5.6.3 or >=4.8.19, <4.8.28 you might just want to go ahead and roll incident response at this point.

Interest in exploiting the TP-Link Archer AX21 Remote Code Execution vulnerability (CVE-2023-1389) holds steady, although CVE-2017-9841 bumps it from the most-exploited #1 spot. If you or friends and family have TP-Link routes at home, consider walking them through the official TP-Link guidelines for getting it patched. However, it's unclear whether this patch process would evict an already present adversary. So better yet would be to make a gift of a secure replacement router to your friend or family member.

Companies with remote working employees may want to take the TP-Link RCE more seriously, as there’s a potential for exploitation to pivot through into employee laptops and on into corporate infrastructure. There are no reported cases of this happening to date, but you may still want to act proactively to ensure that your employee edge devices aren’t vulnerable.

CVE-2024-3721: TBK DVR Remote Code Execution

Exploitation attempts of TBK DVR devices are back in the top 10 with CVE-2024-3721. Unlike TP-Link routers, these are not consumer devices. If your organization has these devices on its edge, you'd do well to replace them and, again, look for signs of compromise. Chances are that's easier said than done as asset inventory is a notoriously hard problem to solve robustly - sorry!

Recon vs Single-Stage Exploits

This month we looked into the exploit payloads of the top 10 CVEs and classified each payload as either reconnaissance or as an immediate single-stage exploit attempt. As our sensors do not give feedback to reconnaissance efforts, we aren’t making a distinction between recon that would result in a follow-up exploitation vs. more benign recon. Table 1 shows the breakdown.
 

CVE # Single-Stage Exploits % Single-Stage Exploits # Total Exploits
CVE-2017-9841 443 1.1% 38,339
CVE-2023-1389 9 0.1% 5,061
CVE-2024-3721 3,655 100% 3,655
CVE-2020-11625 0 0% 3,150
CVE-2022-24847 0 0% 2,275
CVE-2022-22947 0 0% 1,855
CVE-2019-9082 7 0.4% 1,716
CVE-2024-4577 0 0% 1,442
CVE-2022-42475 0 0% 1,115
CVE-2020-8958 0 0% 854
Table 1: Top 10 CVEs with examination of single-stage exploit frequency.

As we can see, single-stage requests for a CVE typically make up 1% of incoming requests, and some CVEs see no single-stage requests at all. This is most easily explained by the nature of the CVE, only CVEs that can directly result in Remote Code Execution in a single step can show up as single-stage in this data.

The percentage of single-stage requests shifts dramatically when a CVE is being actively exploited by a noisy botnet. Mirai variants accounted for 100% of all exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-3721. Amongst the payloads we found a Mirai variant named “hide.arm7”. Static analysis of this file, which was not stripped of symbols and included debugging information, showed many method names common with the Mirai “Beastmode” variant. We obtained this sample from hxxp://154.18.239.232/hide/hide.arm7. For further information, please see the Appendix section below.

Of minor interest were exploitation attempts using CVE-2017-9841, with a number of relatively unsophisticated attacks. This is likely due to the accessibility of PHP payloads for threat actors breaking into the scene. One actor has been using the same stager payloads in pastebin since 2021 [link]. The stager payload we observed has some 2000 hits according to pastebin’s own statistics. As they say, it’s not dumb if it works.

February Vulnerabilities by the Numbers

Figure 1 shows February traffic for the top ten CVEs that we track. As we described earlier, CVE-2017-9841 dominates activity for the month. See the next section “Targeting Trends” for an easier to understand view using a logarithmic scale in Figure 3.

Top 10 CVEs for Ports 80/443, February 2025
Figure 1. Top ten vulnerabilities by traffic volume in February 2025. CVE-2017-9841 dominates the CVE volume for the month.

Figure 2 is a bump plot showing the change in traffic volume and position over the last twelve months. We can see that while CVE-2017-9841 has seen pronounced activity this month, June’s spike in activity was even more pronounced. Growth continued for CVE-2024-3721, as well as for CVE-2020-11625. CVE-2023-1389 has seen significant variation looking back to fall through summer of 2024, but saw no significant change in activity in recent months.

Figure 2. Evolution of vulnerability targeting in the last twelve months. Pronounced activity in CVE-2017-9841 that is still dwarfed by the June 2024 spike.

Figure 2. Evolution of vulnerability targeting in the last twelve months. Pronounced activity in CVE-2017-9841 that is still dwarfed by the June 2024 spike.

Figure 3 shows traffic for the top 20 CVEs by all-time traffic, followed by a monthly average of the remaining CVEs.

Several CVEs had significant upticks in volume this month, of which CVE-2017-9841 is the most notable. CVE-2019-9082 has broken from its otherwise downward trend, CVE-2022-47945 has seen revived interest, and CVE-2024-4577 has continued its upward trend. The biggest falloff in volume was by CVE-2023-23752. Time will tell if this falloff is the beginning of a downward trend here.

Figure 3. Evolution of vulnerability targeting in the last twelve months. This view accentuates the recent changes in CVE acvitity, of which CVE-2017-9841 is the most notable.

Figure 3. Evolution of vulnerability targeting in the last twelve months. This view accentuates the recent changes in CVE acvitity, of which CVE-2017-9841 is the most notable.

Conclusions

Most CVEs saw upward trends in volume this month. Exploitation of PHPUnit was back at the #1 spot for activity, and Mirai continues to exploit TBK DVRs. We recommended Enterprises consider taking action to replace TP-Link routers in use by remote working employees. Finally, we saw that in general 1% of exploitation requests are single-stage exploits and explained the nuance to this statistic.

Appendix: Details on Mirai Variants

Further analysis of the website at hxxp://154.18.239.232 found several more platform specific compilations of the same Mirai variant. All of these were submitted to VirusTotal. Of the variants, the .x86 and .spc versions had been submitted previously. The checksums of the other platform variants are listed below, and can be used to view the VirusTotal analyses.

URL: (defanged) hxxp://154.18.239.232

This IP is in the netblock 154.18.239.0/24 which is registered to Cogent, and then to UltaHost, a global hosting provider. This particular netblock is registered with an address of Jurong, Singapore.

By loading the url hxxp://154.18.239.232/hide/ we were able to get a directory listing which included several versions of the malware we had observed being fetched.

The files were all timestamped 2025-02-26 22:29.

Platform Variations
  • hide.arm: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.arm5: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-uClibc.so.0, stripped
  • hide.arm6: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.arm7: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, with debug_info, not stripped
  • hide.m68k: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, Motorola m68k, 68020, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.mips: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.mpsl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.ppc: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, PowerPC or cisco 4500, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.sh4: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Renesas SH, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.spc: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, SPARC, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
  • hide.x86: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped
sha256sums

9a4853a2ff7be9ccfd8cf5e0dda6ff50f318a6f081f905c7791ad8bd70774dd5  hide.arm

63bcb375729db0675df9ec91633778c2f3b47d49b13f13c38d2069f0e3ac2426  hide.arm5

d3d739d8fd664ed7e9dcf87997508dbb270e8d749231d4ab70183e1ba8f48e9e  hide.arm6

d551083639c3666e48324d3c36fcb0a32f218c72640486c83398fbb11d39be86  hide.arm7

4b59237adae094b7664e1786d1c5fb8ccefe7c11e1aace594ad4bd01424e436b  hide.m68k

a453be076c54164bb747194916f9274ea3322b249202917fc2e7b397002d81ed  hide.mips

b993919adcd01a36b4603e22748f62c6cc7e0bf8a72fad741fc3f7f06c9af6ba  hide.mpsl

bc1faf4cd3c411a1273cbd0114846f6ae9539715d3effe0a5b6e5b62db0b8bd5  hide.ppc

24f8e5c0ede64a232078d6584c75e8f3e35e810a9cbbdc6114e8c7bb76d5779a  hide.sh4

415b0bc279ee6ef354e9620a22cbcccf087493cad137ebb9b4b1fccdd9e2e5cf  hide.spc

9f1b42c2402117540177f5798ac9b6c072bd3612aadfe6d892586feb490e2944  hide.x86

Previous article in this series

Recommendations

Technical
Preventative
  • Scan your environment for vulnerabilities aggressively.
  • Patch high-priority vulnerabilities (defined however suits you) as soon as feasible.
  • Engage a DDoS mitigation service to prevent the impact of DDoS on your organization.
Technical
Detective
  • Use a WAF or similar tool to detect and stop web exploits.
  • Monitor anomalous outbound traffic to detect devices in your environment that are participating in DDoS attacks.
Authors & Contributors
Merlyn Albery-Speyer (Author)
Sr Cybersecurity Threat Researcher
Malcolm Heath (Contributor)
Principal Threat Researcher

Read More from F5 Labs

Enterprises Should Consider Replacing Employees’ Home TP-Link Routers
Enterprises Should Consider Replacing Employees’ Home TP-Link Routers
03/06/2025 article 4 min. read
The Dangers of DNS Hijacking
The Dangers of DNS Hijacking
01/09/2025 article 6 min. read
2025 Cybersecurity Predictions
2025 Cybersecurity Predictions
12/17/2024 article 14 min. read